The argument I have picked is Euthanasia. An argument against the right to die. I don't see how my case proves against undoing attention. I do not draw any conclusion on the argument. The discussion laid out in this document has certainly frustrated me from favoring a right to die. I am very far from all things considered judgment.
My argument addressed to a question of public policy, especially, whether the law or the canons of medical practice should include a rule requiring, under specified
circumstances, that caregivers honor a patient's request to be allowed or perhaps even
helped to die. This question is specific from the question of whether anyone is ever properly entitled to be allowed or helped to die. I believe that the answer to the recent question is yes, but I doubt whether our proper right to facilitate some people's deaths is best discharged through the formation of a governmental right to die.
I believe that the answer to the latter question is yes, but I doubt whether our moral obligation to facilitate some people's deaths is the best discharge through the establishment of an institutional right to die although I do believe in our obligation to facilitate some deaths, I want to dissociate myself from some of the arguments that are frequently offered for such an obligation.
These arguments, like many arguments in medical ethics, rely on terms borrowed from Immanuel Kantian moral theory terms such as 'dignity' and 'autonomy'. various kinds of life-preserving treatment are said to violate a patient's dignity or to detain him in an undignified state; and the patient's right of autonomy is said to require that we respect his competent and considered wishes, including a wish to die. there may or may not be some truth in each of these claims. yet when we evaluate such claims, we must take care not to assume that terms like dignity and autonomy always express the same concepts, or carry the same normative force, as they do in particular moral theory. when Kant speaks, for example, of the dignity that belongs to persons under the rational nature, and that places them beyond all price he is not invoking anything that requires the ability to walk unaided, to feed oneself, or to control one's bowels.
Thus the dignity invoked in a discussion of medical ethics a status supposedly threatened by physical deterioration and dependency cannot be the status whose claim on our moral concern is so fundamental to Kantian thought. we must, therefore, ask whether this sort of dignity, whatever it may be, takes a value that's equally worthy of protection. my worry, in particular, is that the word 'dignity' is sometimes used to dignify, so to speak, our culture's obsession with independence, physical strength, and youth. to my mind, the dignity defined by these values a dignity that is ultimately incompatible with being cared for at all is a dignity not worth having I have similar worries about the values expressed by the phrase 'patient autonomy' for there are two very different senses in which a person's autonomy can become a clue for us.
On the other hand, we can obey the categorical imperative, by declining to act for reasons that we could not rationally propose as valid for all rational beings, including those who are affected by our actions, such as the patient. what we value in that case is the capacity for self-determination, and we value it in a particular way, namely, by according it respect. we respect the patient's autonomy by regarding the necessity of sharing our reasons with him, among others, as a constraint on what decisions we permit ourselves to reach. on the other hand, we can value the patient's autonomy by making it our goal to maximize his effective options. what we value. in that case, it is not the patient's capacity but his effective options. what we value.
in that case, it is not the patient's capacity but his opportunities for self-determination he having choices to make and the means with which to implement them, and we value these opportunities for self-determination by regarding them as goods as objects of desire and pursuit rather than respect. these two ways of valuing autonomy are a fundamental difference, respecting people's autonomy, in the Kantian sense, is not just a matter of giving them effective options. to make our own decisions only for reasons that we could rationally share with others is not necessary to give the decisions to make, nor is it to give them the means to implement their actual decisions. as with the term 'dignity', then we must not assume that the term 'autonomy' is always being used in the sense made familiar by Kantian moral theory; and we must, therefore, ask ourselves what sort of autonomy is being invoked and whether it is indeed something worthy of our moral concern.
I believe that, as with the term 'dignity', the answer to the latter question may be no in some cases, including the case of the right to die despite my qualms about the use of Kantian language to justify euthanasia, I do believe that euthanasia can be justified, and on Kantian grounds. in particular, I believe that respect for a person's dignity, properly conceived, can require us to facilitate his death when that dignity Is being irremediably compromised.
I also believe, however, that a person's dignity can be so compromised his capacity for fully rational and autonomous decision making. So although I do not favor euthanizing people against their wills. of course, neither do I favor a policy of euthanizing people for the sake of deferring to their wills since I think that people's wills are usually impaired in the circumstances required to make euthanasia permissible. The sense in which I oppose a right to die, then, is that I oppose treating euthanasia as a protection option for the patient.