Why is a lion not evil?

Question

One often hears the claim that animals who kill and such, are not in fact evil. The typical example is that of a lion or a tiger that kills a prey. The argument is more or less that the animal acts instinctively in order to survive and thus we cannot fault it for killing a prey. It must eat meat to live, therefore it is forced to do so. End of story. This argument has two parts. There's the instinctive part, i.e. that the animal *just acts*, without thinking too deeply about it, hence it is not evil. Then there's the *necessity* part, i.e. it *has* to eat meat to survive. Both parts sound suspect to me. On the instinctive part, ... well, many humans who commit evil acts often do so instinctively, because it is part of their innate evil nature to do so. Surely just because something is instinctive, doesn't mean one is absolved from responsibility. In fact, to be evil means *precisely* that one has evil instincts. Nobody becomes evil by thinking philosophically a posteriori about ethical paradigms and theories and coming up with the most evil one. People *are* evil instinctively. So this part of the argument seems of no use.The second part is equally confusing. So just because you "have" to do something in order to survive, then all bets are off? You can do whatever you want, just because you "have" to? So if I took a person, put a bullet to their head, and said I'd kill them unless they pressed a button which would destroy all other life in the Universe, then if this person pressed that button, they would not be evil? They would be exempt from responsibility, just because they "had" to do it to survive? I'm sure some Objectivists ascribe to such a philosophy, but surely most well-functioning humans find this approach to ethics completely absurd. To conclude, my question is, what actually *is* a good argument for why animals are not evil (because I, as most others, also intuitively think that animals are not "really" evil, so a better argument than the above must exist).

Answer 1

A few thoughts:

First, there are some philosophers who have argued that some non-human animals are the proper "targets" of our praise and blame, and this is because they think that, whatever it is that makes us the proper targets of praise and blame, some non-human animals have it too.

Second, for those of us who do not think that non-human animals are the proper targets of praise and blame might offer the following reason as to why it is that, e.g. tigers, are not morally responsible for anything they do. The reason is that it's plausible that a necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, condition for some thing to be morally responsible for its actions is that the actions in question are done in light of having a sufficient grasp of the relevant moral facts. This view would have it that if I wrongly take a candy bar from a store and I'm responsible for this wrong, then at the time of taking the candy bar I had a sufficient grasp of the moral facts--i.e. I had a warranted true belief that if I were to take a candy bar in this particular situation, it would be wrong of me to do so. Now, though it's plausible that some non-humans animals are capable of some degree of reason, it's at least doubtful that any non-human animal has or could have a sufficient grasp of any moral fact, and therefore it's at least doubtful than any non-human animal's actions are such that the actions in question are done in light of having a sufficient grasp of the relevant moral facts.

Notice that this view is consistent with non-humans either doing or being able to do wrong actions. Suppose that an alpha-tiger kills every member of his streak. I would say that the alpha-tiger's action is wrong. However, because I don't think the alpha-tiger can act in light of having a sufficient grasp of any moral fact, I don't think the alpha-tiger acted in light of having a sufficient grasp of the relevant moral facts, so I don't think he is morally responsible for the wrong he did.