Philosophy: Abortion

Question

1. Philosophical arguments for abortion tend to focus on the following criteria of personhood, which the fetus DOES NOT possess, according to Mary Ann Warren: a.) consciousness (awake, alert, of one’s surroundings, and sentient (the ability to feel pain/pleasure) b.) Self-motivated activity c.) communication d.) self-awareness. (presence of self-concepts) e.) developed capacity to reason: Are these sufficient criteria of personhood? They seem to be necessary in talking about human persons, but are they sufficient? Can you find any problem with this argument or would you add any criteria to the list of personhood?

Answer 1

I think several things should be taken note of here:

(1) Warren's criteria for personhood are at least implicitly influenced by Post-Modern and Enlightenment theories of ethics and the constant emphasis on minds as being equivalent to human personhood per se. Hence, Descartes emphasized that the mind is the "I" of the Cogito!

(2) A better definition of "person" is what is given by medieval philosophy: "an individual substance of a rational nature." Or even more precise, "personhood" in humans is a combination of the human nature (rationality + animality) with subsistence. Subsistence is simply that which is the terminus or "end" of nature, much in the same way that a point terminates a line (this is the way it was explained by the philosopher Peter Auriol).

(3) Much like the excellent answer given above, we can question Warren's argument by showing that the criteria she gives are not necessary for personhood. For example, a person in a coma may not have consciousness the way other humans possess it, but presumably this would not lead us to deny his/her personhood. Similarly, viability would not solve the issue or fill in the "gap".

(4) In terms of personality being required for the pro-life argument, I would note that the problem of the Imago Dei theology is practically unavoidable here. One must first substantiate some objective standard of morals first before delving into particular cases of ethics. Just as you have to know "All men are mortal", and that "Socrates is a man" before one can deduce that Socrates is mortal.

Answer 2

You seem to be asking a couple questions here. First, you ask whether (a) through (e) are jointly sufficient for personhood. The answer to this depends on who is answering it as there is no settled view on the matter. For example, someone could argue that while all persons can communicate, there is nothing essential to being a person that requires communication; here, one can reject (c) and endorse all other conditions for personhood. Relatedly, you mention that all (a) through (e) seem to be necessary for human personhood, but for the same reasons someone can reject any one of the conditions listed for various reasons; for instance, we do not stopping being persons (if we are) by simply falling into unconscious sleep every night. So, the list of conditions you have provided will be contentious based on who you ask, and the same goes for adding anything to that list.

The other question seems to be implied when you ask if there is any problem with this argument. Setting aside the list, we can ask why a fetus' person status ethically matters at all. On the one hand, if a fetus is a person, that does not imply that abortion is wrong since even adult persons can be killed or left to die for morally defensible reasons. This is why JJ Thomson's violinist example is so powerful; if a highly skilled violinist was using your body as life support, that does not mean it is morally wrong for you to remove yourself as the violinist's life support even if doing so leads to his death. On the other hand, if a fetus is not a person, that does not imply that abortion is perfectly fine since killing or letting non-persons die can be wrong for other reasons too. For example, some think animals are not persons yet still think it is wrong to kill them. The same goes for humans in permanent vegetative states which some think are non-persons; it could still be morally questionable to pull the plug depending on the details of the case. So, the problem that needs to be addressed is why it ethically matters whether a fetus is a person for abortion to be wrong or right.