What does Wittgenstein's notion of "meaning is use" refer to?

Question

Wittgenstein's later work in the Philosophical Investigations breaks away from the commitment that logic is the underlying structure of language which explains its relation with the world. Later Wittgenstein realized that there isn't a logical underlying structure to language that needs to be discovered to understand the problems of philosophy. In this context, what does Wittgenstein refer to when he says "Meaning is use"?

Answer 1

Wittgenstein's later work drifted away from logical structures not because they were an illegitimate method of determining a way to get at philosophical questions. Rather, Wittgenstein criticized his earlier work for how quickly he and the logical positivists/empiricists dismissed anything outside the conception of logical understanding (something true by its own lights via analytic truths, or true verified by how it figures in a factive empirical world) as nonsense. Throughout the Investigations, Wittgenstein refers to the many ways we use language as different "forms of life", or different ways that human beings relate to their world. In denoting these forms of life, Wittgenstein says that what we mean through our language is largely determined by how we use sentences, utterances, propositions, etc. This point is crucial to understanding Wittgenstein's meaning of "language games": what a word/sentence means is how it is carried out through conventions that we understand in day-to-day life.