Peter Uvin’s socio-psychological explanation of genocide emphasizes that participation in mass violence often stems less from ideological fanaticism and more from everyday social pressures, conformity, and the normalization of brutality. His perspective resonates strongly with Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men, which recounts how members of Reserve Police Battalion 101, middle-aged German men with no prior history of violence, became perpetrators of mass executions in Nazi-occupied Poland. Browning shows that these men were not radical zealots but “ordinary” individuals who, through peer pressure, obedience to authority, and the gradual desensitization to killing, participated in atrocity.
This aligns with Sutherland’s Differential Association Theory, which holds that behavior is learned through interaction with peers. In both Rwanda (as Uvin describes) and Nazi-occupied Poland (as Browning details), perpetrators internalized violent norms through repeated exposure and reinforcement within their groups. Similarly, Akers’ Social Learning Theory extends this point by noting that rewards (such as social acceptance, avoidance of punishment, or small privileges) and punishments (including exclusion, shame, or fear of reprisal) create an environment where participation becomes the rational choice.
Yet, when juxtaposed with Strain Theory, another layer emerges. Strain emphasizes that individuals turn to illegitimate means when legitimate opportunities are blocked. In genocidal contexts, violence is often framed as a path to restoring order, achieving status, or alleviating frustration caused by political and economic inequality. This contrasts with Uvin’s micro-level focus, suggesting that while interpersonal pressures explain “how” ordinary individuals kill, structural inequalities and nationalist ideologies help explain “why” such violence becomes thinkable.
Browning’s account further illustrates the tension between agency and coercion. Notably, men in Battalion 101 were given the option not to participate in killings, yet very few refused. This fact strengthens Uvin’s point: participation was not solely about obedience to authority but about the overwhelming socio-psychological pressure to conform, avoid ostracism, and maintain group cohesion. It also connects to Neutralization Theory, where individuals justified their actions through denial of responsibility “I had no choice”, denial of injury, “they are the enemy”, or appeal to higher loyalties, “duty to the Fatherland”.
The juxtaposition, then, is clear: Uvin and Browning illustrate the immediate social mechanisms that transform ordinary individuals into perpetrators, while criminological theories such as strain, differential association, and neutralization frame these mechanisms within broader structures of inequality, political manipulation, and moral disengagement. Together, they reveal that genocide is not the work of monsters alone but of ordinary men and women shaped by extraordinary circumstances, where the pressure to conform can outweigh individual morality.
This is a complex question and answer, as nationalism, religion, and political beliefs will play a significant role in influencing individuals. From the dawn of time, man has struggled with these issues, and there is no singular answer. If I were Diogenes, I would be very cynical about the world today.
